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Does patenting increase the private incentives to innovate?  
A microeconometric analysis 
Abstract 
This paper examines whether patenting increases the private incentives to innovate in 
manufacturing. To study this issue, we build a model in which the value of an innovation 
depends both on the type of innovation implemented (product, process) and on the existence 
of a patent protection or not. We obtain a three-equation model that links the values of 
product and process innovations to the value of patent protection. This model and the 
feature of the data imply the estimation of a censored trivariate Probit model. We reach two 
main conclusions. First, the value of patent rights increases the incentives to innovate in 
products but not in processes and, conversely, the value of product innovations only – and 
not the one of process innovations – increases the incentives to patent. Second, we find that 
the distributions of product innovations and of patent values are skewed contrary to the 
values of process innovations. A significant share of the skewness in product values would 
come from the efficiency differences of intellectual property rights between the different 
activities. 
Keywords:    Innovation, Patent, GHK simulator, System of limited dependent variables, 
Asymptotic least squares 
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Les brevets accroissent-ils les incitations privées à innover ? 
Un examen microéconométrique 
Résumé 
Cet article examine si les brevets accroissent les incitations privées à innover dans 
l’industrie manufacturière. Pour cela nous construisons un modèle où la valeur d’une 
innovation dépend à la fois du type d’innovation réalisée et de son éventuelle protection par 
un brevet. On en déduit un système à trois équations reliant les valeurs des innovations de 
produit et de procédé à la valeur de la protection par le brevet. Ce modèle permet de justifier 
l’estimation d’un modèle Probit trivarié et censuré. Nous parvenons à deux résultats 
principaux. Premièrement, la protection par le brevet augmente l’incitation à innover en 
produit mais pas en procédé et, réciproquement, seule la valeur des innovations de produit - 
et non celle des innovations de procédé - augmente l’incitation à breveter. Deuxièmement, 
les distributions des valeurs des brevets et celles des innovations de produits sont 
asymétriques, à la différence des innovations de procédé. Une part significative de cette 
asymétrie viendrait des différences d’efficacités de la protection par le brevet entre les 
différentes activités. 
Mots-clés : Innovation, Brevet, Simulateur GHK, Système d’équations à variables 
qualitatives, moindres carrés asymptotiques 
Classement JEL: C15, C35, L60, O31, O34   3
Introduction 
«  Patent regimes play an increasingly complex role in 
encouraging innovation, diffusing scientific and technical 
knowledge, and enhancing market entry and firm creation. As 
such they should be subject to closer scrutiny by science, 
technology and innovation policy makers. » 
(OECD Ministers of Science and Technology, 
Conclusions of January 2004 meeting) 
 
Since information has the characteristics of a public good, it is generally agreed that the 
market will fail to provide a sufficient production of knowledge. The production of knowledge 
by private agents is affected by several imperfections that prevent an optimal R&D 
investment by the market. Knowledge has non-rivalry and non-exclusion properties that drive 
the private return on knowledge below its social return. Therefore, R&D has been a long-
standing field of state intervention in advanced countries. Different types of policy measures 
have been implemented in order to stimulate the production of knowledge. A first type of 
intervention is to create public research institutions in order to encourage fundamental 
research, which is the source of many industrial applications. A second type of measure 
aims at reducing the private cost of R&D: this includes R&D subsidies to firms (David, Hall 
and Toole, 2000; Duguet, 2004), R&D tax credit (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000), support to 
cooperative R&D (Jacquemin, 1988; Jorde and Teece, 1990; Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2002). A third set of measures aims to encourage research by increasing the private return 
on R&D. One manner to reach this objective is to set a patent system in order to weaken the 
non-exclusion property of knowledge, by granting property rights on immaterial goods. The 
choice between these systems, or their specific combination in each country, will depend on 
the common beliefs about the efficiency of a direct state intervention versus a law system 
whose use is let to market participants.
1 The evaluations that have been performed on 
                                                       
1 The use of the R&D tax credit is also left to the discretion of market participants, but it can be changed by the state 
according to a policy, contrary to property rights that are more stable over time. The direct interventions allow for 
active innovation policies, while the patent system let the initiative of innovation decisions to the market 
participants.   4
subsidies and tax credit conclude that these measures are efficient (in the sense that they 
increase total R&D investments); the issue of the evaluation of the patent system has been 
less investigated. 
Another motivation for this paper is based on empirical considerations (Figures 1 and 2): the 
use of patents has considerably increased over the last two decades in the most 
technologically advanced countries. The interpretation of this evolution is however 
ambiguous. It is possible that the increase of the number of patents results from an increase 
of the number of patentable innovations and, in this case, the reinforcement of patents rights 
that occurred over the same period could have had a positive effect on innovation. But 
another interpretation is also conceivable: this rise in the number of patents could express 
strategic considerations related to patent applications, like preventing litigation or the will to 
improve the bargaining power in technological negotiations (Duguet and Kabla, 1998). In the 
latter case, the reinforcement of patent rights could have been neutral on welfare, or even 
negative if we account for the social cost of the patent system. 
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From a social viewpoint, the design of a patent system should result from a trade-off 
between the social costs and benefits. The gains of the reinforcement of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) result from the rise of the number of innovations and from a greater diffusion of 
knowledge during the patent life; the costs of the patent system include the inefficiencies 
related to market power and the cost of the judicial system. In the literature, this situation has 
often been summarized by the trade-off between dynamic efficiency (new products, new 
processes) and static efficiency (competitive pricing). From the firms’ point of view, patent 
applications are interesting when the ability of the patent system to prevent imitation is 
sufficiently strong to compensate the legal and “bearing” costs of the patents. 
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The empirical studies conducted on this topic remain cautious. The results obtained so far 
seem however to depend strongly on the activity considered. Overall, a first set of studies 
conclude that the patent system would have had a positive effect on innovation in 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals (Grabowsky and Vernon, 1985; Park and Ginarte, 1995 at 
the aggregate level, Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen, 2003 and, in a lesser extent, Branstetter 
and Sakakibara, 2001). A second set of studies stresses that the differences in property   6
rights modify the choice of the country of application and the direction of technological 
change, that is the domain in which firms’ R&D investments are performed. Moser (1999), 
from nineteenth century data, shows that the firms that operate in countries where there is 
no patent system tend to direct their innovations in the activities where secrecy is efficient 
compared to patenting. Lerner (2001) finds that, over the period 1850-2000, the countries 
that have reinforced their property rights have attracted more innovations from the other 
countries but have not made more innovations of their own. Last, a third set of studies reach 
conclusions that are less favorable to the patent system. Hall and Ziedonis (2004) show that 
the doubling of the patent to R&D ratio in the semiconductor industry would result mostly 
from the will to avoid litigation, a conclusion similar to that of Duguet and Kabla (1998) on 
French manufacturing. These strategic considerations are also omnipresent in the studies by 
Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000). In service activities, Bessen and 
Hunt (2004) conclude that the extension of property rights to software would have led to a 
decrease of R&D investment at the firm level. The latter conclusion, unfavorable to the 
patent system, meets other considerations on the potentially harmful effects of patent rights 
on innovation output when knowledge is cumulative. Thus, Bessen and Maskin (2002) 
emphasize that an activity like software has achieved a remarkable development without a 
patent system. 
This paper scrutinizes the effect of the patent system on the innovation output of the French 
manufacturing firms. The restriction to manufacturing corresponds to the field of patent rights 
in France. Compared with the previous literature, we develop the analysis in two directions. 
Our first contribution is to study the causality that goes from the value of patents to the value 
of innovations – or the contribution of patenting to the output of research investments – while 
the previous studies have focused on the other causality. We do it in a setting that allows for 
a simultaneous determination of the values of patenting and of innovations. Our second 
contribution is to allow for differences of appropriation behavior depending on the type of 
innovation considered (products, processes). Thus, we extend the previous empirical works, 
which suggest that the patents would be more efficient at protecting products rather than   7
processes; the latter being more efficiently protected by secrecy. Our model allows for 
testing that assumption. 
We reach two main conclusions. On the one hand, patent protection increases the incentive 
to innovate in products but not in processes. Conversely, process innovations do not 
contribute to increase patenting once product innovation is accounted for. On the other hand, 
while the distribution of the values of processes is symmetric, the distributions of the product 
and patent values are skewed. A large part of product innovations have a small value and a 
small part a large value. This skewness would partly originate in the skewness of the 
efficiency of property rights among lines of business. 
In the first section, we present a model that accounts for the interdependence between the 
value of patents and the values of product and process innovations. The second section 
presents the data and the estimation method is detailed in section 3. It accounts for the fact 
that one can observe a patent when a firm has innovated only (selection bias) and allows for 
testing the validity of the model (overidentification) constraints. The results are discussed in 
section 4.   8
I - Model 
The model that follows represents one way to interpret our econometric application. It gives 
a justification to the simultaneity relationships between the decisions to innovate and to 
patent, as well as to establish the identification constraints of the system that we estimate 
later. Other models may be compatible with our estimation. 
We consider a firm facing a three-step decision process. In the first step, the firm decides 
whether to invest in innovation activities or not; in the second step, the innovation output is 
known and its importance, denoted µ, depends on the amounts invested in research. In the 
third step, the firm decides whether it applies for a patent, knowing both the value of its 
innovation and its appropriability (a random variable denoted ε).
2 We solve this problem by 
backward induction. 
 
I.1 Decision to patent 
At the last step, the value of innovation without protection, denoted µ, and the appropriability 
disturbance, denoted ε, are known. The firm compares the values of its innovation with and 
without a patent protection. The value of a patented innovation can be written: 
() ( ) ( ) µ × µ ε + = ε µ appro X , , P , V 1 , 
where P(.) is the patent premium and  appro X  a set of explanative variables related to the 
appropriability of innovations at the firm level. The patent premium can be interpreted as the 
percentage gain of the innovation value attributable to the patent system: 
                                                       
2 This random variable reflects the variations of market power granted by the patent. It could be interpreted as 
“success” as far as the considered innovation need to be “novel” to be patentable (novelty requirement) For 
instance, the actual life of a patent may vary from one line of business to another, depending on the quantity of 
information disclosed in the patent document. If the information has a strong diffusion and the innovation is 






Extending Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen (2003), we assume that the patent premium can 
depend on the quality of the innovation. For our application, we will assume later than:  
( ) 1 − β + µ α + ε = µ ε appro appro brev appro X X , , P . 
The firm will patent when the patent premium is positive: 
( ) appro appro brev appro X X , , P β − µ α − > ε ⇔ > µ ε 1 0 . 
 
I.2 Research investment 
At the second step, the firm has not yet observed whether its innovation is successful or not 
(i.e., the value of  ε) but has an idea on its distribution. We denote  () . Φ  the cdf and  () . φ  the 
pdf of this distribution (assumed to be gaussian in the application). We also assume that the 
quality of the innovation depends on the amount of R&D invested, denoted r, in the following 
manner: 
( ) inno X , r f = µ , 
where  inno X  denotes the determinants of innovation different from research investments. 
The firm chooses its amount of R&D, r, by maximizing its expected profit, denoted Π  : 
() () ( ) ( ) r d d X , , P
P P
V
appro − ε ε φ µ + ε ε φ µ + µ ε = Π ∫ ∫ ≤ > 0 0
1
4 4 43 4 4 42 1
 
under the constraint  () inno X , r f = µ . It is useful to define the expected patent premium, 
denoted z: 
1 − β + µ α = appro appro brev X z    10
so that the expected profit can be written: 
( ) ( ) ( ) r z z z − Φ + φ + µ = Π 1 . 
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 = µ inno
* * X , r f  and  1 − β + µ α = appro appro
*
brev
* X z . The previous relationship 
implicitly defines the optimal amount of R&D and therefore the quality  * µ  of the innovation. 
This amount depends on the environment of the firm that can be decomposed into two parts: 
first, the innovative environment summarized by the variables in  inno X  and, second, the 
institutional environment summarized in the  appro X  vector. The latter includes the 
appropriation possibilities in the firm’s line of business. It is important for estimation to 
remark that the appropriability conditions intervene in the first-order condition through the 
expected patent premium  * z  only. Using the innovation function  () inno X , r f = µ  at the 
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One contribution of this study is to measure the firm-level incentives that patents provide to 
innovation; this effect is measured by  * * z ∂ µ ∂ . Notice that the quantity that is commonly 
estimated in the previous literature is close to  * * z µ ∂ ∂ . Furthermore, the previous equations 
highlight the identification conditions essential for the estimation to follow. The appropriation 
condition  appro X  affects innovation output through the patent premium only, and the 
innovative environment affects the patent premium through the value of innovation only.   11
Therefore we have at least one variable that intervenes in one equation and not in the other; 
needless to say that this exclusion constraints needs to be tested. The estimation method we 
use – namely, asymptotic least squares – allows for testing these overidentification 
constraints directly. On our data, these restrictions are accepted at conventional levels of 
significance. 
I.3 Econometric model 
In order to estimate the theoretical model we have to account for the following data 
constraints
3. Firstly, the information on innovation output and on patent applications is 
available on the same period (1997-1999), so that we have to account for their simultaneity, 
at least for time aggregation reasons.
4 This innovation data comes from the FIT
5 survey. 
Secondly, the only information available is dichotomous; we know whether a firm has 
patented and whether it has innovated (in products or processes separately) so that we will 
need to estimate a three-equation Probit model. Thirdly, the matching of the innovation 
surveys with the standard R&D surveys would have made us lose a large number of firms 
due to differences of sampling. Therefore, we have used the CIS2
6 survey that provides 
information on the R&D expenditures over the period 1994-1996 and whose sampling is 
close to the FIT survey. We use the same theoretical model for products and for processes, 
which is possible because we focus on the patent premium; however, since we observe 
patenting only globally, we have to interpret the patent premium  * z  as a global premium 
defined at the firm level and not at the innovation level. However, we show below that it is 
possible to decompose the patent premium between products and processes. Fourthly, we 
observe patenting when the firms have innovated only; therefore, we have to account for a 
selection bias. 
                                                       
3 See below for a description of our data. 
4 See Mundlak (1961) for a discussion. 
5  FIT: Financement de l’Innovation Technologique (Funding of Technological Innovation). This survey was 
performed by Sessi (French Ministry of Industry) in 2000. It also provides information on the appropriation 
conditions. 
6 CIS for Community Innovation Survey. Therefore our data is comparable with the one of the other European 
countries. The CIS are coordinated across countries by EUROSTAT.   12
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*
prod,  are the values of product and process innovations and ( ) proc prod u , u  
the usual disturbances of an econometric model. The third endogenous variable,  * z , is not 
random. Since we observe the decision to patent only, we shall rewrite the model as a 
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This formulation of the model shows that we certainly face endogeneity problems since the 
success disturbance ε intervenes in all the equations. This property is important for 
choosing the estimation method
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7 One has to account for cross correlations in the Reduced Form to get consistent first step estimators - see below 
for more precision on the estimation procedure. 
ε ,  prod u  and  prod u  are also correlated if for exemple some unobserved heterogeneity drives both innovative 
behaviour and appropriation behaviour.   13
The three previous binary variables are endogenous. The definition of the third variable 
comes from the fact that one can observe a patent application ( 0 > * P ) only when the firm 
has innovated in product ( 0 > µ*
prod ) and/or in process ( 0 > µ*
proc ). This selection bias is 
important because the disturbances of the three equations are correlated. We explicitly 
account for it when we estimate the model.   14
II - The data 
II.1 Sample construction 
The sample results from the matching of the four following sources of firm-level data:
8 
1.  « Financement de l’Innovation Technologique » (FIT) survey. It was collected by 
SESSI in 2000 in manufacturing, and provides global information over the period 
1997-1999.  
2.  Community Innovation Survey (CIS2). It was collected by SESSI in 1997 in 
manufacturing and provides information over the period 1994-1996. 
3.  BRN administrative file. It is collected by the tax administration (“Direction 
Générale des impôts") and provides information about accounting data for the 
year 1996. 
4.  Line of business industry census. It was collected by SESSI in 1996 among firms 
of 20 employees or more and includes the decomposition of a firm’s sales, 
employment and exports for all its lines of business. 
The FIT survey covers manufacturing firms with 20 employees or more, except food industry 
and construction. This definition corresponds roughly to the set of innovations that are 
patentable in France (services cannot be patented). However, the size threshold indirectly 
excludes a part of the start-ups. We take the three endogenous variable of our analysis from 
this data set: the product innovation dummy, the process innovation dummy and the patent 
application dummy. We also take from this survey one of the variables needed for the 
identification of the model: the firms’ assessment on the patent system.
 9 
                                                       
8 The matching is performed easily since all French firms have a national identification number whose use is 
compulsory (called the SIREN number). 
9 See the appendix for a detailed presentation.   15
The CIS2 is the French part of the Community Innovation Survey that is coordinated by 
EUROSTAT. The Community surveys are performed jointly by the members of the European 
Union. We use the information on the innovation inputs over the period 1994-1996: internal 
R&D expenditures, external R&D expenditures, expenditures on equipment goods that 
incorporate innovations, as well as a product imitation rate at the line of business level (see 
appendix I). 
Last, the data from BRN and EAE provide the firm-level accounting data for the year 1996: 
Sales, Lerner index, sales diversification index, Herfindahl index of sales concentration and 
an export dummy. 
The four data sets have been matched from the SIREN identification of the firms. Our final 
sample includes 1027 firms, all engaged in (successful or unsuccessful) innovation activities. 
II.2 Sample statistics 
Tables 1 to 4 present some sample statistics. Overall, the firms that are involved in research 
activities have a median size of 191 employees. They export more than the fourth of their 
production. Table 2 summarizes the innovative output of these firms. The most innovative 
activities are electrical equipment, chemicals, electrical component, houseware and 
pharmaceuticals. The product and process innovations are strongly correlated, since 58% of 
the firms implement these both types of innovation together. Yet, a significant share of firms 
innovate in product only (21%). Process innovation without product innovation is less 
common (13%) but some industries depart from the average behavior. For instance, 45% of 
the firms in printing and publishing make process innovations only; the figure is 20% for 
wearing apparel and leather as well as metalworking. Industries in advanced lines of 
business can also make a strong use of processes; for instance 17% of the firms in 
shipbuilding, aircraft and rail make process innovations only, even though the majority of 
innovators in this industry make both product and process innovations (Figure 3). These 
differences in innovation behaviors should have consequences on the patenting behavior of   16
the firms: indeed, the processes are more easily protected by secrecy than the products, so 
that the patenting rate should be smaller in the industries that innovate strongly in processes. 
Table 1: Sample statistics 
  1st Quartile  Median  3rd Quartile  Mean 
% :      
Lerner index 
(Value added minus labor cost / Sales)  3.7  7.3 11.7 7.8 
Value added / Sales  9.9  20.1  30.3  18.0 
Exportations / Sales  3.6  19.8  45.4  27.3 
Labor cost / Production  15.6  20.5  27.0  21.9 
Thousands of Euros :      
Value added minus labor cost / Employees  3  9  16  12 
Sales / Employees  88  122  171  143 
Value added / Employees  36  45  58  50 
Number of employees  58  191  580  669 
 
Table 2: Innovation output by industry 
  Innovation (%)  Activity (%) 














C1: Wearing apparel, leather  58 63 42 17 21 63 33  4 
C2: Printing and publishing  45  82  37  8  45  39  47  13 
C3:  Pharmaceuticals  81 73 62 19 11  3  54 43 
C4:  Houseware  87  76  68  19 8 44  39  17 
D0:  Cars  79 79 66 13 13 23 41 36 
E1:  Shipbuilding,  aircraft,  rail  78 83 65 13 17 22 61 17 
E2: Non-electr. machinery  85  63  56  29  7  33  55  12 
E3:  Electrical  machinery  92  77  73  19 5 13  39  48 
F1:  Mineral  products  71 70 55 16 14 71 19 10 
F2:  Textile  70 72 56 14 16 49 47  5 
F3: Wood and paper  68  77  55  14  23  52  36  11 
F4:  Chemicals  88  69  64  24 5 33  44  23 
F5:  Metalworking  70 65 45 24 20 45 40 14 
F6:  Electrical  components  88 79 67 21 12 16 49 34 
Manufacturing  79 71 58 21 13 46 44 10 
   17
Figure 3: Innovation profile by industry 
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Table 3: IPR use and assessment by industry 
  Patent 
application  Intellectual property rights (patent) % 
Code : Industry  %  Not important  Weakly 
important  Important 
C1: Wearing apparel. leather 12.5  58.3  16.7  25.0 
C2: Printing and publishing  7.9  79.0  18.4  2.6 
C3: Pharmaceuticals  70.3  29.7  48.7  21.6 
C4: Houseware  54.7  36.0  40.0  24.0 
D0: Cars  64.3  35.7  32.1  32.1 
E1: Shipbuilding. aircraft. rail  56.5  26.1  34.8  39.1 
E2:  Non-electr. machinery  62.4  23.3  44.6  32.2 
E3: Electrical machinery  67.9  27.4  45.2  27.4 
F1: Mineral products  55.1  27.5  40.6  31.9 
F2: Textile  32.6  55.8  18.6  25.6 
F3: Wood and paper  47.7  52.3  20.5  27.3 
F4: Chemicals  67.5  21.7  38.3  40.0 
F5: Metalworking  51.1  38.2  30.8  30.9 
F6: Electrical components  63.0  28.8  31.5  39.7 
Manufacturing  56.1 33.5  36.0  30.5   18
The lines of business where firms patent the most are ones where the codification of 
knowledge is the easiest and where cooperation and technological negotiations are 
necessary to make significant advances. It is clearly the case when knowledge is strongly 
cumulative. The activities where firms patent the most are (Table 3) pharmaceuticals, 
electrical machinery, chemicals, electrical components and non-electrical machinery (more 
than 60%). Some activities, on the contrary, neglect patenting. It is the case of printing and 
publishing (8%) where 82% of the firms innovate in processes. It is also the case in wearing 
apparel and leather (12%) and in textile (32%), where other protections than patent exist 
(trademarks, textile models). Overall, 56% of the firms patent, which is small for a sample of 
firms that declare they are involved in research activities. 
Table 4: Innovation and assessment of IPRs 
The amounts are in thousand Euros 
  Sample Product Process  Both  types  Patenting  Not 
  Total Innovators  Innovators  Innovators    Patenting 
IPR protection considered as:        
-  unimportant  33.5 28.9 33.7 28.8 15.8 55.7 
-  weakly  important  36.0 37.9 36.1 38.5 43.8 26.4 
-  important  30.5 33.2 30.2 32.7 40.5 17.9 
Several innovation projects (%)  61.6 68.5 66.6 72.3 77.6 43.0 
Internal R&D        
Yes  (%)  70.5 77.4 70.9 77.7 85.1 53.5 
Mean expenditure  7 384  8 230  9 319  10 075  10 007  1 904 
First  quartile  152 152 152 152 228  76 
Median  520 610 730 763 913 152 
Third quartile  2 166  2 567  3 046  3 356  3 400  730 
External R&D        
Yes  (%)  29.4 32.4 31.3 34.5 40.6 15.2 
Mean expenditure  3 160  3 543  3 607  3 906  3 939  543 
First  quartile  46 53 76 76 78 30 
Median  152 152 152 183 152  76 
Third  quartile  656 761 762 762 762 259 
Acquisition of innovative equipment        
Yes  (%)  44.0 46.5 48.6 50.8 51.3 36.3 
Mean expenditure  1 854  2 136  2 022  2 269  2 490  682 
First  quartile  76 76 76 91 91 76 
Median  305 305 305 305 305 152 
Third  quartile  763 914 869 914  1  065  457 
 
Table 4 presents the assessment of IPRs according to the type of innovations implemented 
and according to the patent practices of firms. Overall, only a third of the firms in our sample 
declare that IPRs are important. This figure is stable whatever the innovation profile of the 
firms. As expected, the firms that patent value the IPRs more than the other firms but they do   19
not value it importantly: 60% of the patenting firms think that intellectual property is 
unimportant or weakly important against 82% for the non-patenting firms.  
Table 5: Patent applications by innovating firms 








Patenting firms  93.7 76.6 70.3 23.4  6.3 













All firms  86.1 77.4 63.6 22.6 13.9 
 
The Table 5 highlights the importance of product innovation in the decision to patent. Two 
interesting facts show up. Firstly, while the patenting firms innovate more often in products 
than the non-patenting firms, they do not innovate more in processes than the non-patenting 
firms. Secondly, while the patenting firms have the same probability to innovate in products 
only than the non-patenting firms, the patenting firms have a four times smaller probability to 
innovate in process only than the non-patenting firms. These two facts suggest that there is 
a positive association between product innovation and patenting. 
The aim of our application is to study this issue more rigorously, with regression methods, in 
order to see by which extent the innovations are patented and whether patenting influences 
the innovation output.   20
III - Model estimation 
III.1 The selection bias 







ε + β + µ α + µ α =
ε × α − + β + α = µ



























































































 µ µ *
proc , *
prod max  
Only firms that have innovated answer to the question on patenting in the FIT and CIS2 
questionnaires. If this selection was not taken into account we would have a selection bias 
because the disturbance of the patent equation is correlated with the disturbances of the 
innovation equations; our estimates will confirm it for product innovations.
 10 
The model estimation is made in two parts: 
                                                       
10 To our knowledge, the only innovation study that accounts for this kind of problem is Monjon and Waelbroeck 
(2003).   21
1.  We estimate the reduced form of the model. Assuming that the vector of the 
disturbances is normal, we estimate this model by simulated maximum likelihood, 
using a GHK simulator. 
2.  Using the reduced form estimator, we estimate the structural form of the model by 
asymptotic least squares. This step is also useful for testing the overidentification 
constraints of the model. 
 
III.2 Simulated maximum likelihood 
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The quantities that need a specific treatment are the ones that involve triple integrals. For 
instance, the probability that a firm makes both types of innovation and patents, denoted 
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where  () . 3 ϕ  is the trivariate standard normal density function. In order to evaluate the 
previous probability, we use Bayes’ theorem:   22
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Since  Σ is positive definite, there exists a lower triangular matrix Λ  such that  ' ΛΛ = Σ  
(Cholesky decomposition). Therefore, we can write: 
3 33 2 32 1 31 3





λ + λ + λ = η
λ + λ = η
λ = η
 







































































Now let  1 v ~  be a normal variable truncated from below by  11 1 λ π −X  and  2 v ~  a normal 
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D
p  
where  () . Φ  is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. The other probabilities are 
approximated with the same method; the simulated likelihood is then maximized with the 
routines available under SAS-IML. 
The obtained estimator is convergent for D →∞ and n →∞ (n being the number of 
observations). But the GHK simulator has two particularly interesting properties. First, the   23
simulated quantities are continuous with respect to the parametersand this facilitates the 
optimization. Second, many empirical works have shown the effectiveness of this, 
convergence being obtained for a number of simulations much lower than for other 
simulation-based methods. The asymptotic conditions which ensure the convergence of the 
method of simulated (log-)likelihood are thus reached with a number of draws much lower 
than that required by other simulators. 
III.3 Asymptotic least squares 
The estimator of the censored trivariate Probit model obtained in the previous section is a 
simulated (pseudo) maximum likelihood estimator. Let  ( )' ' ˆ , ' ˆ , ' ˆ ˆ 3 2 1 π π π = π  be the vector of the 
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In order to get back the parameters of the structural form of the model, we use the 
identification constraints of the model. For this, we introduce the exclusion matrices  j A  that 
are defined by:
11 
j j X A X =    with    { } brev , proc , prod j∈  
Equating the mathematical expectations of the structural and of the reduced form of the 
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Since the X matrix is of full column rank, we obtain the following identification constraints: 
                                                       
11 These matrices are made of 0 and 1. They indicate whether a variable is present (1) or absent (0) of the equation 
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With these notations, it is possible to rewrite the identification constraints under a form that is 
linear according to the parameters of the structural form: 
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In the usual terminology of asymptotic least squares, π is called the auxiliary parameter 
(reduced form), and β is called the parameter of interest (structural form). In order to get a 
consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of the parameter of interest, we replace the 
auxiliary parameter by its estimator: 
ω + β = π H ˆ ˆ , 
where  ω is a random variable that appears because we have replaced π  by π ˆ . The 
covariance matrix of this error term is equal to: 




























where g is the number of explanative variables in the reduced form (i.e., the number of 
columns of X). The estimation of the auxiliary equation is performed in two steps. In a first   25
step, we perform ordinary least squares (OLS) on the identification constraints in order to 
estimate M consistently. In a second step, we perform feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) using  () ()' M ˆ ˆ V ˆ M ˆ V ˆ π = ω  as the covariance matrix. 
Eventually, since our model is overidentifiable, we test the overidentification constraints with 
the following statistic: 
( ) ω ω ω = − ˆ ˆ V ˆ ' ˆ S 1 . 
Under the null assumption that the overidentification constraints are valid or, more precisely, 
that there exists an estimator compatible with the overidentification constraints, this statistic 
is asymptotically distributed according to a Chi squared distribution with  k g−  degrees of 
freedom, where g is the number of (first-order) parameters of the reduced form and k is the 
number of (first-order) parameters of the structural form of the model. Our model appears 
compatible with the data (p-value : 0.865). 
    26
IV - Results 
The estimates are presented in Table 6. The reduced form of the model is useful to compare 
our results with the previous literature on the innovation function. The firms that have the 
highest probability to patent are the ones that do the more internal and external R&D, that 
work on several research projects at the same time, that have a large size and achieve a 
high mark-up rate. Most of these determinants are similar to the ones of innovation output. 
One can distinguish the determinants of patenting from the determinants of innovation in the 
structural form of the model only. However, we notice that the degree of technological 
opportunities does not influence patenting even though it influences both types of innovation. 
These results mean that, once controlled for innovation inputs, the firms that operate in the 
most scientifically promising activities do not patent more than the firms that operate in older 
activities. 
The reduced form of the product innovation equation provides results that are already known 
in the previous literature: the probability to innovate in products increases with internal 
research, the degree of technological opportunities, export but also with the importance of 
IPRs. Two other variables have an important effect on product innovation : working on 
several projects at the same time increases the probability to launch new products while, at 
the opposite, the probability to be imitated by competitors reduces product innovation. Both 
effects indicate that the value of product innovation may depend on patenting. However, the 
structural form of the model is needed to distinguish clearly the determinants of product 
innovation from the determinants of patenting. 
Compared to product innovations, process innovations rely on a more informal research 
process based on the purchase of innovative equipment goods (embedded innovations). 
This is in line with previous studies that obtain a similar result for the improvement of 
processes (Duguet, 2002). The probability to innovate in processes increases with the size 
of the firms, the fact to work on several projects at the same time and with the degree of 
technological opportunities. An important difference with product innovation is that process   27
innovation does not depend on the importance of IPRs. The reason often advocated to 
explain this result is that process innovations are better protected by secrecy. Indeed, 
product innovations can be purchased by the competitors and reverse-engineered, contrary 
to processes that are kept in house (industrial espionage is more difficult, and illegal). 
The structural form is useful since it allows to study the direct interactions between patenting 
and innovation. Therefore it provides a way to study the issue of patent data quality, 
especially when they are used to measure the innovation performance in international 
comparisons or over time for the same country. 
Our results allow concluding that only product innovations have a significant effect on 
patenting. Thus, the firms prefer to rely on secrecy to protect their processes. A significant 
part of the processes are however patented too, but it is likely that these are patented when 
firms innovate both in products and processes - that is when these two types of innovations 
are complementary. Patent statistics are therefore biased in favor of product innovations. 
Patenting also increase with the importance of IPRs and with the diversification of the firm. 
The first result suggests both that when IPRs are more efficient firms patent more and that 
IPRs are sometimes needed for technological negotiations. The second result suggests that 
when a firm operates in several lines of business it has more to lose by non-patenting than a 
single activity firm. Overall, the firm-level explanative variables summarize a large amount of 
heterogeneity between firms since most industry dummies are not significant. 
The existence of patent protection originates from the will to increase the private return on 
research and development. We find that this mechanism works for new products only. Since 
patent rights increase the private returns on products it should encourage the firms to do 
more research than they would do without a patent protection. This point is further confirmed 
by another econometric result on the product imitation rate. This rate is computed at the 
industry level and gives the percentage of firms that launch products that are new for them 
but that are not new for the market. This imitation rate has a negative effect on product 
innovation, therefore appropriability problems remain. The original model introduces this 
imitation rate in all the equations of the model; the only effect that is significant at the 5%   28
level appears the product innovation equation. We can conclude that product imitation 
reduces the private return of product innovation only. In our structural model, this result also 
implies an indirect reduction of patenting through the reduction of the number of product 
innovators. Overall, the patent system encourages the private R&D investment in products. 
The other determinants of product innovation are in line with the previous literature: research 
expenditure, technological opportunities, diversification and export increase the value of 
product innovation. 
Process innovation follows different determinants. Patent has no significant influence on the 
probability to innovate in processes. This point comforts the result that we have found on the 
patent equation: since the process is not the motivation to patent it is not surprising that 
patenting does not affect directly the value of process innovation.
12 The firms that innovate in 
processes prefer relying on secrecy. Furthermore, we find that the disturbance of the 
process and patent equations are uncorrelated. Under our normality assumption, this implies 
that processes and patents are conditionally independent. The variables that increase the 
value of processes are the expenditures on innovative equipment goods, the fact to 
undertake several projects at the same time and the size of the firm. These results suggest 
that the processes that are patented would be the ones that are strongly associated to a new 
product. This also implies that an important part of technical knowledge does not pass 
through the patent system but needs other diffusion channels, like cooperation in R&D for 
example. 
 
                                                       
12 Notice that there is always an indirect influence in a structural system. Here process innovations are 
complementary to product innovations. Therefore, even though there is no direct connection between processes 
and patents, there remains an indirect relationship between product and processes. In econometric terms, our 
result means that there is no relationship between patents and processes once controlled for product innovation.   29
Table 6: Model estimation 
  Reduced form  Structural form 
  Patent Product  Process Patent Product  Process 
Patent  - - - -  0.35**  (0.12)  0,03  (0,12) 
Product  - - -  0.77**  (0.22)  - - 
Process  - - -  0.53  (0.41)  - - 
Importance of IPRs (ref. none)        
moderate  0.78** (0.13)  0.25** (0.11)  0.03 (0.12)  0.56** (0.16)  -  - 
strong  0.99** (0.14)  0.38** (0.13)  0.01 (0.13)  0.71** (0.19)  -  - 
Internal R&D (ref. None)        
moderate 0.24*  (0.14)  0.43**  (0.12)  -0.20 (0.14)  -  0.36** (0.12)  -0,19 (0,14) 
strong  0.56** (0.15)  0.76** (0.15)  -0.04 (0.15) - 0.55**  (0.16)  -0,04  (0,17) 
External R&D (ref. None)        
moderate  0.26* (0.15)  0.23 (0.16)  0.09 (0.15)  -  0.17 (0.12)  0,09 (0,14) 
strong 0.38**  (0.17)  -0.06  (0.16)  0.05 (0.14)  -  0.06 (0.13)  0,16 (0,14) 
Equipment and machinery expend. (ref. None)        
moderate  0.10 (0.14)  -0.08 (0.14)  0.40** (0.14) - -0.16  (0.14)  0,40**  (0,14) 
strong  -0.05 (0.14)  -0.07 (0.12)  0.21* (0.12)  -  -0.12 (0.10)  0,18 (0,12) 
Several innovation projects  (ref. No)        
yes  0.35** (0.12)  0.23** (0.56)  0.28** (0.12)  0.01 (0.20)  0.12 (0.13)  0,28** (0,14) 
Degree of techn. opportunities (ref. None)         
moderate  0.17 (0.12)  0.49** (0.10)  0.22** (0.11) -0.32  (0.20) 0.43**  (0.11) 0,21*  (0,11) 
strong  0.18 (0.14)  0.48** (0.14)  0.27* (0.15)  -0.33 (0.25)  0.41** (0.15)  0,27* (0,15) 
Other firm-level characteristics:        
Ln(Sales)  0.23** (0.04)  0.06 (0.04)  0.12** (0.04)  0.12 (0.08)  -0.02 (0.05)  0,11** (0,05) 
Mark-up rate  1.45** (0.69)  0.08 (0.61)  0.50 (0.63)  1.22 (0.92)  -0.50 (0.66)  0,47 (0,65) 
Ln(Div Herfindahl equivalent number)  -0.04 (0.16) -0.39**(0.17) -0.26  (0.17) 0.43* (0.26)  0.40** (0.18)  -0,25 (0,17) 
Exportation dummy  -0.10 (0.18)  0.28** (0.13)  -0.02 (0.17)  -0.33 (0.24)  0.34** (0.14)  -0,02 (0,17) 
Ln(Herfindahl market concentration)  0.03 (0.06)  0.05 (0.05)  -0.03 (0.06)  0.01 (0.08)  0.04 (0.05)  -0,03 (0,06) 
Sectoral variables:         
Ln(Imitation rates)  -1.18 (0.77)  -1.49**(0.64) -0.25  (0.73)  -  -1.04**(0.44)  - 
        
C1 : wearing apparel and leather  -0.88**(0.44)  -0.23 (0.26)  -0.01 (0.35)  -0.74 (0.49)  0.10 (0.33)  0,02 (0,37) 
C2 : printing and publishing  -0.57 (0.50)  -0.45* (0.24)  0.03 (0.36)  -0.30 (0.56)  -0.22 (0.32)  0,05 (0,36) 
D0 : car industry  -0.13 (0.27)  -0.40* (0.21)  0.01 (0.25)  0.18 (0.35)  -0.36 (0.22)  0,02 (0,37) 
E1 : shipbuilding. aircraft and rail  -0.50 (0.47)  -0.73**(0.30)  0.24 (0.45)  -0.09 (0.62)  -0.53 (0.36)  0,30 (0,45) 
F3 : wood and paper  0.24 (0.24)  -0.25 (0.19)  0.35 (0.28)  0.20 (0.35)  -0.30 (0.20)  0,32 (0,28) 
F5 : metalworking  -0.07 (0.15)  -0.35**(0.12)  -0.09 (0.15)  0.23 (0.21)  -0.32**(0.13)  -0,09 (0,14) 
F6 : electrical components  -0.24 (0.20)  -0.44**(0.19)  0.02 (0.19)  0.07 (0.28)  -0.33 (0.21)  0,04 (0,19) 
Intercept (ref. 
C3+C4+E2+E3+F1+F2+F4)  -4.11**(0.62) -1.44**(0.56) -1.62**(0.59) -2.21**(0.99)  0.03 (0.67)  -1,41**(0,67) 
Variance :        
Patent  1 (imposed)  0.14** (0.06)  0.00 (0.05)       
Product    1  (imposed)  0.12**  (0.05)     
Process     1  (imposed)     
Log-likelihood  -2208.90     
Overidentification test :       
Statistic      3.915 
Degrees of freedom        8 
p-value      0.865 
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The estimations that we have performed also allow for taking a first look at the issue of the 
distribution of the returns on innovation. Since the contributions by Pakes and Schankerman 
(1986) and Scherer (1998), we know that the distributions of patent and innovation values 
are skewed, with some innovations highly valuable and many innovations of little value. In 
order to examine this issue on our data, we have computed the predictions of the latent 
variables of the patent, product innovation and process innovation equations. According to 
our theoretical model, these predictions represent a standardized estimation of the value of 
patenting and innovation at the firm level. The Figures 4 to 6 show the distributions of the 
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Three main results emerge from this analysis. First, the distribution of innovative processes’ 
values is symmetric. The surface representing the projects carried out (i.e., with a positive 
value) is important compared to the total of “potential” projects. Second, the distribution of 
innovative products’ values is highly skewed, as in the previous literature. Here as well, a 
large number of the potential innovations are carried out. Third, the distribution of patent 
value is clearly influenced by the distribution of product innovation value and is also skewed. 
However, we find a difference between the product and patent value distributions: there are 
much less patents carried out (i.e., positive patent premium) than product innovations; this 
translates the fact that many product innovations are not patented. This result is in line with 
the previous studies by Levin et al. (1987), Duguet and Kabla (1998), who find that patenting 
is not the favorite appropriation mechanism of industrial firms. Technological advances, a 
rapid renewal of products, or good distribution networks are other means capable of 
increasing the private return on research. 
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Finally, our estimation suggests an explanation to the asymmetry of product innovations’ 
values. Table 6 shows that this asymmetry would come partly from the differences in the 
efficiency of the patent rights from one firm to another. Thus, there would  be few innovations 
with a large value not only because there are few good innovative ideas, but also because 
few lines of businesses would be really protected from imitation and many lines of business 
are poorly protected by the available appropriation mechanisms. 
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Conclusion 
This study throws some light on several issues related to the efficiency of the patent system 
and the information content of patent data. 
It clearly appears that patenting is not automatic for all among manufacturing firms and that 
only some types of innovations are patented. We find that product innovations are the sole 
significant contributors to patenting. Process innovations, at the opposite, follow ways that 
draw aside industrial property rights. Conversely, the patent system significantly increases 
the private return on product innovation but is unable to influence the private return on 
process innovations. Theses results suggest examining theoretical models in which the 
patent rights would not protect processes – as is often the case – but products. Our results 
also suggest that among the theoretical analyses performed so far, the ones that rely on 
product innovations should be the more relevant to patenting analysis. 
Another point deals with the interpretation of patent statistics.
13 Our analysis shows that in 
France these statistics are representative of product innovations but not of process 
innovations. In addition, these statistics tend to overestimate the innovative output in the 
activities were patent rights are efficient. Therefore, the patent statistics exaggerate the 
innovation output of the countries that are strongly present in activities were knowledge is 
easy to describe in patent documents and that make new products (pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, electronics, components) and to underestimate innovation output in the countries 
whose activities generate new processes (printing, shipbuilding, aircraft and rail, wood and 
paper). 
 
                                                       
13 We do not discuss here the issue of the comparability of the patents systems of different countries.   35
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Appendix I : Data sources 
The innovation concept used in the two innovation surveys is defined in the Oslo Manual 
(OECD). The technological innovations include the technologically new products and 
processes, as well as the important technological improvements of products and processes. 
Either these innovations are new for the firm and not for the market (incremental innovation), 
or they are new for both the firm and its market. In the latter case, we refer to it as “radical” 
innovation. The definition used in the survey excludes design or organizational innovations, 
the changes of packaging and seasonal changes. 
«  Financement de l'Innovation Technologique  » Survey (Financing of 
Technological Innovation Survey) 
We use the following items of the FIT survey: 
1.  In 1997, 1998 or 1999, has your firm launched products that were 
technologically innovative (or technological improved) from your firm’s 
viewpoint? (Yes/No). 
2.  Do you manage several technologically innovative projects in parallel? 
(Yes/No). 
3.  Knowledge leaking: How do you assess the risk that, at the end of each step 
of your technologically innovative projects, other firms can benefit freely from 
your results? “Patent (infringement, patenting around)” (irrelevant/very 
weak/weak/strong/very strong). 
4.  In 1997, 1998 or 1999, has your firm (or the group it belongs to) applied for at 
least one patent in France or in another country? (Yes/No). 
5.  Do you consider that your main line of business is technologically: not 
innovative/weakly innovative/moderately innovative/strongly innovative?   38
 
Second Community Innovation Survey (CIS2) 
We use the answers from the following questions from CIS2: 
1  Between 1994 and 1996, has your firm launched products that were 
technologically innovative (or improved) from your firm’s viewpoint? (Yes/No). 
2  Between 1994 and 1996, has your firm launched products that were 
technologically innovative (or improved) not only from your firm’s viewpoint, 
but also for its market? (Yes/No). 
3  In 1996, has your firm been involved in the following innovative activities? If 
yes, indicate the corresponding expenditures : 
 Internal  R&D; 
  External R&D (including from another firm in your group); 
  Purchase of machinery and equipments in relation to product and 
process innovations. 
4  Between 1994 and 1996, has your firm applied for a least one patent in 
France or in another country? (Yes/No) 
 
Explanative variables 
1.  Lagged product innovation, process innovation and patent application dummy 
variables. Available in CIS2. 
2.  Importance of intellectual property rights. This variable corresponds to the 
fourth question of the FIT survey. The reference value is « irrelevant »; the   39
intermediate value regroups « very weak » and « weak »; the highest value 
regroups « strong » and « very strong ».  
3.  Firm-level assessment of the technological opportunities in the line of 
business. Corresponds to question 6 in the FIT survey. The reference value is 
« not innovative »; the intermediate value regroups « weakly innovative » and 
« moderately innovative », the strongest value is « strongly innovative ».  
4.  Innovation input variables (internal R&D, external R&D, innovative equipment 
and machinery expenditures). These variables are constructed from the third 
question of CIS2. For each variable the reference value is the absence of any 
investment; the intermediate value is reached when the ratio of the investment 
to sales is lower than the sample median (among strictly positive values); the 
highest value is reached when the ratio of the investment to sales is higher 
than the median (among strictly positive values). 
5.  Size variable. The logarithm of sales in 1996.  
6.  Diversification : the logarithm of the Herfindahl equivalent number of lines of 
business (equal to the inverse of the Herfindahl index). This index is computed 
from the decomposition of each firm’s sales among its lines of business. For a 




















 and we use  ( ) ( ) i i H ln DIV ln 1 = . 
Notice that when all the shares are equal  i i i k , i k ,..., k , k / S S 1 1 = ∀ = , the 
equivalent number of activities  i DIV  is equal to the real number of activities 
i k . When a firm is not diversified, the equivalent number is equal to one. 
7.  Average concentration index. It generalizes the Herfindahl index to multi-
products firms.   40





















where  k n  that operates on market k. The average concentration index is 















therefore  i H / 1  measures the equivalent number of firms on the average 
market where firm i operates. We include the logarithm of this competition 
measure in our regressions. 
8. Lerner  index.   It is a firm level measure of market power: 
Sales EBE Li = , where “EBE” (excédent brut d’exploitation) equals valued 
added minus labor cost. This is an accounting approximation of 
() () p c p pq q c p − = − . This variable reflects the capacity of the firm to price 
above its (marginal=average here…) cost c. 
9.  Exportation dummy (equals one when a firm exports). 
10.  Sectoral variables. We include a full set of industry dummies at the two-digit 
level (NAF36) and a variable that aims to measure the probability to be 
imitated by competitors when one launches a new product (at the three-digit 
level in order to ensure identification). This variable is computed from CIS2 
and should reveal the degree of competition between the innovative firms 
since it influences the degree of substitution between their innovative 
products. This variable is computed the following way and is a special case of 
Crépon, Duguet and Kabla (1996). Let : 
  k p  the percentage of product innovators in industry k (three-digit decomposition);   41
  I
k p  the percentage of product imitators in industry k. They are defined as the firms 
that launched innovative products that were new for the firm but not for the market; 
  M
k p  the percentage of real product innovators in industry k. They launched a 
product that is new both for them and for the market.  
We have the identity :  M
k
I











The coefficient 1/2 comes from the fact that, in our data, the real product innovators are 
always almost product imitators too.
14 We also computed an imitation rate from the sales 
of innovative products. The latter measure always gave us less good results on the 
regression, possibly because of measurement error.   
                                                       
14 This is the difference between Crépon et al. (1996) that worked on a larger data set. See this reference for a 
generalization of the previous formula.   42
Appendix 2: Variables on the efficiency of property rights 
The variable about the assessment of the efficiency of industrial property rights relies on the 
answers to the following question in the FIT survey: 
“ How important do you consider the risk that, at the end of each stage of your research 
project, other firms can benefit freely from your results? 
Patent (infringement, patenting around): irrelevant, very weak, weak, strong, very strong “. 
We interpret this variable as expressing the degree of importance that the firms attribute to 
patent protection, as well as an appreciation on the efficiency of the patent system. However, 
since the question is not formulated exactly in this manner, our interpretation must be 
validated by other measures. Therefore, we have examined the correlation between the 
answers to the previous question and the following measures: the judgment on the efficiency 
of patents available in the Appropriation survey (“Yale 2”) and the product imitation rate 
computed from CIS2 (1994-96). We find the following correlations between the average 
scores at the two digit level: 
Variables  Correlation 
coefficient 
1993 : Efficiency of patents to protect products (score 1-4)  0.59 (0.025)** 
1993 : Efficiency of patents to protect processes (score 1-4)  0.18 (0.536) 
1993 : Patents do not prevent imitation by competitors (score 1-4)  −0.32 (0.272) 
1993 : Patents disclose too much information (score 1-4)  0.49 (0.079)* 
FIT :  Knowledge leaking from exploratory research  0.90 (<0.001)** 
FIT :  Knowledge leaking from R\&D  0.96 (<0.001)** 
p-values in brackets. **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. 
The Figure A.1 illustrates the previous correlations. The variable we use describing patent 
rights efficiency is positively correlated with the efficiency of patents variable available in the 
Appropriation survey (“Yale 2”) and negatively correlated with the product imitation rate 
computed from CIS2. It is also positively correlated with the score on the fact that patent 
disclose too much information.   43
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Appendix 3: Estimation controlling for lagged innovation 
and patent dummies 
This appendix presents the results we obtain when introducing the lagged dependent 
variables into the three regressions. The endogenous variables refer to 1997-1999 and the 
lags to 1994-1996. One objective of this additional regression is to capture potentially 
missing variables that could bias the estimates. 
The results show that the lagged dependent variables capture a large part of the individual 
variations. Overall, the coefficients of the exogenous variables are weakened by this 
introduction. However the only deception is on the patent equation, since the introduction of 
the lagged patenting variables cancels the effects of innovation. This could come from the 
data limitation that we observe only the fact that a firm patents and not the number of patents 
(not available yet at INSEE after 1994). However, a more positive result appears in the 
innovation equations. While lagged product innovation is highly significant, patenting has still 
a significant and positive effect on product innovation. Last, patenting has still no effect on 
process innovation. These two last results are therefore robust to an important change of 
specification.   45
  Reduced form  Structural form 
  Patent Product  Process Patent Product  Process 
Patent  - - - -  0.36**  (0.14)  0.08  (0.14) 
Product  - - -  0.29  (0.34)  - - 
Process  - - -  0.63  (0.48)  - - 
Lagged patent  0.87** (0.13)  0.20 (0.14)  -0.09 (0.12)  0.95** (0.18)  -0.17 (0.19)  -0.21 (0.19) 
Lagged product  0.08 (0.16)  0.70** (0.12)  0.03 (0.15)  -0.06 (0.29)  0.66** (0.13)  -0.02 (0.15) 
Lagged process  -0.18 (0.14)  0.10 (0.12)  0.40** (0.12)  -0.37 (0.27)  0.13 (0.12)  0.38** (0.12) 
Importance of IPRs (ref. none)         
moderate  0.74** (0.13)  0.23** (0.12)  0.07 (0.13)  0.62** (0.16)  -  - 
strong  0.87** (0.14)  0.36** (0.13)  0.05 (0.13)  0.75** (0.19)  -  - 
Internal R&D (ref. None)         
moderate  0.03 (0.16)  0.10 (0.13)  -0.28* (0.16)  -  0.16 (0.13)  -0.19 (0.15) 
strong 0.21  (0.18)  0.37**  (0.17)  -0.12  (0.17)  -  0.35* (0.17)  -0.04 (0.16) 
External R&D (ref. None)         
moderate  0.20 (0.16)  0.10 (0.18)  0.06 (0.15)  -  0.09 (0.17)  0.10 (0.13) 
strong  0.29 (0.18)  -0.13 (0.18)  0.05 (0.15)  -  -0.09 (0.17)  0.15 (0.13) 
Equipment and machinery expend. (ref. None)        
moderate  0.16 (0.15)  -0.25 (0.16)  0.25* (0.15)  -  -0.29* (0.16)  0.28** (0.14) 
strong  0.00 (0.15)  -0.26 (0.13)  0.04 (0.13) -  -0.25*  (0.13)  0.07  (0.12) 
Several innovation projects (ref. No)         
yes  0.36**  (0.12) 0.19  (0.11) 0.26**  (0.12)  0.13 (0.21)  0.06 (0.14)  0.24* (0.14) 
Degree of techn. opportunities (ref. None)        
moderate  0.19 (0.12)  0.42** (0.11)  0.21* (0.11)  -0.07 (0.22)  0.35** (0.12)  0.19* (0.12) 
strong  0.22 (0.15)  0.44** (0.15)  0.24 (0.15)  -0.06 (0.26)  0.36** (0.17)  0.23* (0.15) 
Other firm-level characteristics:        
Ln(Sales)  0.19**  (0.04) 0.06  (0.04) 0.12**  (0.04)  0.10 (0.08)  -0.01 (0.05)  0.10** (0.05) 
Mark-up rate  1.11 (0.72)  0.16 (0.66)  0.53 (0.64)  0.84 (0.86)  -0.38 (0.70)  0.43 (0.65) 
Ln(Div Herfindahl equivalent number)  0.03 (0.17)  -0.34* (0.19)  -0.30* (0.18)  0.30 (0.27)  -0.34* (0.19)  -0.28 (0.17) 
Exportation dummy  -0.12 (0.18)  0.24* (0.13)  -0.05 (0.17)  -0.14 (0.24)  0.28** (0.15)  -0.04 (0.17) 
Ln(Herfindahl market concentration)  0.04 (0.06)  0.04 (0.05)  -0.04 (0.06)  0.05 (0.08)  0.03 (0.06)  -0.04 (0.06) 
Sectoral variables:        
Ln(Imitation rates)  -0.82 (0.80)  -1.23* (0.68) -0.20  (0.74)  -  -1.22**(0.63)  - 
        
C1 : wearing apparel and leather  -0.67 (0.48)  -0.17 (0.28)  0.00 (0.37)  -0.63 (0.49)  0.08 (0.35)  0.07 (0.37) 
C2 : printing and publishing  -0.49 (0.46)  -0.33 (0.25)  0.04 (0.34)  -0.49 (0.51)  -0.09 (0.33)  0.08 (0.34) 
D0 : car industry  -0.10 (0.26)  -0.40* (0.24)  0.02 (0.25)  0.07 (0.33)  -0.38 (0.29)  0.01 (0.25) 
E1 : shipbuilding, aircraft and rail  -0.49 (0.55)  -0.73**(0.31)  0.24 (0.45)  -0.41 (0.67)  -0.57 (0.38)  0.30 (0.45) 
F3 : wood and paper  0.28 (0.25)  -0.37* (0.21)  0.34 (0.28)  0.12 (0.38)  -0.44**(0.21)  0.30 (0.45) 
F5 : metalworking  0.00 (0.15)  -0.29**(0.12)  -0.09 (0.15)  0.13 (0.20)  -0.28**(0.14)  -0.09 (0.14) 
F6 : electrical components  -0.33 (0.22)  -0.46**(0.19)  -0.01 (0.19)  -0.19 (0.28)  -0.36 (0.22)  0.04 (0.20) 
Intercept (ref. C3+C4+E2+E3+F1+F2+F4)  -3.49**(0.65)  -1.48**(0.61) -1.69**(0.61)  1.88  (1.09) -0.31  (0.73)  -1.33**(0.67) 
Variance :        
Patent  1 (imposed)  0.17** (0.06)  0.02 (0.05)       
Product   1  (imposed)  0.11**  (0.05)       
Process     1  (imposed)     
Log-likelihood  -2152.15      
Overidentification test:       
Statistic       4.22 
Degrees of freedom        8 
p-value       0.837 
LRT lagged variables:       
Statistic       113.5 
Degrees of freedom        9 
p-value       0.000 
 